@comment{{This file has been generated by bib2bib 1.91}}
@comment{{Command line: /usr/bin/bib2bib -ob keyword_congestion_pricing.bib -c 'keywords: "congestion pricing"' ref.bib}}
@inproceedings{Arn01,
author = {Richard Arnott},
title = {The Economic Theory of Urban Traffic Congestion: A Microscopic
Research Agenda},
year = 2001,
month = jul,
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Environmental Economics and
the Economics of Congestion},
address = {Venice, Italy},
url = {http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/wp502.pdf},
status = {read},
keywords = {urban economics, transport planning, congestion pricing, parking}
}
@article{Ban04,
author = {David Banister},
title = {Implementing the Possible?},
year = 2004,
month = dec,
journal = {Planning Theory \& Practice},
volume = 5,
number = 4,
pages = {499--501},
keywords = {congestion pricing, urban politics},
status = {read}
}
@book{Dow92,
author = {Anthony Downs},
title = {Stuck in Traffic: Coping with Peak-Hour Traffic Congestion},
year = 1992,
publisher = {Brookings Institution Press},
address = {Washington, D.C., USA},
keywords = { transport planning, congestion pricing, transportation demand management, transit, land use transport link, urban form, induced travel, zoning },
status = {read},
annoteurl = {http://davidpritchard.org/sustrans/Dow92/index.html}
}
@book{Dow04,
author = {Anthony Downs},
title = {Still Stuck in Traffic: Coping with Peak-Hour Traffic Congestion},
year = 2004,
publisher = {Brookings Institution Press},
address = {Washington, D.C., USA},
status = {read},
keywords = { transport planning, congestion pricing, transportation demand management, transit, land use transport link, urban form, induced travel, zoning },
annoteurl = {http://davidpritchard.org/sustrans/Dow92/index.html}
}
@article{Dun04c,
author = {Robert T.~Dunphy},
title = {Pricing Traffic/Pacing Growth},
year = 2004,
month = may,
journal = {Urban Land},
volume = 63,
number = 5,
pages = {88--91},
publisher = {Urban Land Institute},
keywords = {congestion pricing},
status = {read},
annote = {
Some interesting notes flowing from the London congestion
charging scheme. New York has studied the idea, and is in fact
already partway there, since they have tolls on many of the bridges
entering Manhattan.
}
}
@article{Goo04,
author = {Phil Goodwin},
title = {Congestion Charging in Central {L}ondon: Lessons Learned},
year = 2004,
month = dec,
journal = {Planning Theory \& Practice},
volume = 5,
number = 4,
pages = {501--505},
keywords = {congestion pricing, urban politics, transport modelling},
status = {read},
annote = {
Some interesting analysis of the politics in this issue. Goodwin notes
that the
use of revenue from congestion charging is an essential part of any
scheme, in which ``the beneficiaries were as visible and influential as
the motorists who paid it'' even if the only goal is to reduce
congestion, not to raise revenue. In London's case, the revenue was
funneled to public transport improvements.
He also notes the implications for modelling: the traffic
reduction was at the upper end of the range estimated by models,
and the revenues from the scheme were hence lower than expected.
``This is not particular to road pricing: it is part of a general
reappraisal of establish transport modelling techniques, which have
a built-in tendency to underestimate the range and complexity of
the behaviour response to policy, which in turn causes an
overestimation of the benefits of infrastructure expansion, and an
underestimation of the benefits of demand management.'' In a
footnote, he adds that ``some of the earlier modelling work
had actually forecast a bigger effect, closer to what happened, but
this had been progressively revised downwards by the modelling
teams in order to produce robust, defensible, conservative
assessments.''
}
}
@techreport{LevGar00,
author = {Jonathan Levine and Yaakov Garb},
title = {Evaluating the Promise and Hazards of Congestion Pricing
Proposals; An Access Centered Approach},
year = 2000,
institution = {Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies},
address = {Jerusalem, Israel},
number = {2/11},
url = {http://vtpi.org/levgarb.pdf},
keywords = {congestion pricing, equity, accessibility},
status = {read}
}
@article{LevGar02,
author = {Jonathan Levine and Yaakov Garb},
title = {Congestion Pricing's Conditional Promise: Promotion of
Accessibility or Mobility?},
year = 2002,
journal = {Transport Policy},
volume = 9,
number = 3,
pages = {179--188},
keywords = {congestion pricing, equity, accessibility},
status = {read},
url = {http://www.itdp.org/read/Levine\&Garb(2002).pdf}
}
@article{Liv04,
author = {Ken Livingstone},
title = {The Challenge of Driving Through Change: Introducing
Congestion Charging in Central {L}ondon},
year = 2004,
month = dec,
journal = {Planning Theory \& Practice},
volume = 5,
number = 4,
pages = {490--498},
keywords = {congestion pricing, urban politics},
status = {read}
}
@techreport{MooTho94,
author = {Terry Moore and Paul Thorsnes},
title = {The Transportation/Land Use Connection},
year = 1994,
month = jan,
institution = {American Planning Association},
address = {Chicago, IL, USA},
edition = {1st},
number = {448/449},
keywords = {urban economics, transport planning, urban planning, congestion pricing, transportation demand management, transit, land use transport link, zoning },
rating = 5,
status = {read},
annoteurl = { http://davidpritchard.org/sustrans/MooTho94/index.html }
}
@article{SanRoj04,
author = {Georgina Santos and Laurent Rojey},
title = {Distributional impacts of road pricing: the truth behind the
myth},
year = 2004,
month = feb,
journal = {Transportation},
volume = 31,
number = 1,
pages = {21--42},
keywords = {congestion pricing, equity},
status = {read},
abstract = {
This paper shows that road pricing can be regressive, progressive
or neutral, and refutes the generalised idea that road pricing is
always regressive. The potential distributional impacts of a road
pricing scheme are assessed in three English towns. It is found
that impacts are town specific and depend on where people live,
where people work and what mode of transport they use to go to
work. Initial impacts may be progressive even before any
compensation scheme for losers is taken into account. When the
situation before the scheme is implemented is such that majority of
drivers entering the area where the scheme would operate come from
households with incomes above the average, it can be expected that,
once the scheme is implemented, these drivers coming from rich
households will continue to cross the cordon and will be prepared
to pay the charge. In such a case the overall effect will be that
on average, rich people will pay the toll and poor people will not.
}
}
@article{Sie04,
author = {Matti Siemiatycki},
title = {The International Diffusion of Radical Transportation Policy:
The Case of Congestion Charging},
year = 2004,
month = dec,
journal = {Planning Theory \& Practice},
volume = 5,
number = 4,
pages = {510--514},
keywords = {congestion pricing, urban politics},
status = {read}
}
@article{Urr04,
author = {John Urry},
title = {Social Engineering: Responding to {K}en {L}ivingstone},
year = 2004,
month = dec,
journal = {Planning Theory \& Practice},
volume = 5,
number = 4,
pages = {506--509},
keywords = {congestion pricing, sociology},
status = {read}
}
@article{VerNijRie95,
author = {Erik Verhoef and Peter Nijkamp and Piet Rietvald},
title = {The economics of regulatory parking policies: the
(im)possibilities of parking policies in traffic regulation},
year = 1995,
month = mar,
journal = {Transportation Research A},
volume = 29,
number = 2,
pages = {141--156},
status = {read},
keywords = { parking, congestion pricing, urban economics },
abstract = {
This article contains an economic analysis of regulatory
parking policies as a substitute to road pricing. The scope for
such policies is discussed, after which a simple diagrammatic
analysis is presented, focusing on the differences between the
use of parking fees and physical restrictions on parking space
supply. The former is found to be superior for three reasons:
an information argument, a temporal efficiency argument and an
intertemporal efficiency argument. Finally, a spatial parking
model is developed, showing that it may be possible to overcome
the difficulty of regulatory parking policies not
differentiating according to distance driven by specifying the
appropriate spatial pattern of parking fees, making individuals
respond to (spatial) parking fee differentials.
}
}
@book{ArnRavSch05,
author = {Richard Arnott and Tilmann Rave and Ronnie Schob},
title = {Alleviating Urban Traffic Congestion},
year = 2005,
publisher = {MIT Press},
address = {Cambridge, MA, USA},
keywords = {congestion pricing, transport planning, urban economics, bicycle planning, parking},
annote = {
Apparently contains a fairly positive view of cycling, from a group
of economists.
}
}
@article{Ban89,
author = {David Banister},
title = {Congestion: market pricing for parking},
year = 1989,
journal = {Built Environment},
volume = 15,
number = {3/4},
pages = {251--256},
keywords = {parking, congestion pricing}
}
@article{BhaHig92,
author = {Kiran U.~Bhatta and Thomas J.~Higgins},
title = {Road and Parking Pricing: Issues and Research Needs},
year = 1992,
journal = {Transportation Research Record},
volume = 1346,
pages = {68--73},
keywords = {congestion pricing, parking}
}
@techreport{Cal02,
author = {Edward Calthrop},
title = {Evaluating on-street parking policy},
year = 2002,
institution = {Katholieke Universiteit Leuven},
type = {Working Paper},
number = {2002-03},
keywords = {urban economics, congestion pricing, parking},
url = {http://weblog.kuleuven.be/dlcount.php?id=ete\&url=http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ete/downloads/ete-wp02-03.pdf},
abstract = {
This paper uses a formal model to examine the welfare gains from a
marginal increase in the price of on-street parking. The
benefits of such a policy are shown to depend on the
improvement in search externalities in the on-street parking
market itself, plus effects on other distorted urban transport
markets, including congested freeway and backroad use,
mass-transit and off-street parking. The paper makes two further
contributions. The model is sufficiently general that several
well-known results from the parking literature emerge as
special cases. The model is used to review the existing
literature and highlights findings in separate parts of
literature. Finally, a numerical simulation model is used to
investigate the order of magnitude of an optimal urban parking
fee. In particular, these results confirm the importance of
taking into accounts effects on other distorted transport
markets when deciding upon the level of the price for on-street
parking. The model confirms that while parking pricing reform
may lead to substantial improvements in parking search times,
there is little overall impact on road congestion levels.
}
}
@techreport{CalPro02,
author = {Edward Calthrop and Stef Proost},
title = {Regulating on-street parking},
year = 2002,
institution = {Katholieke Universiteit Leuven},
type = {Working Paper},
number = {2002-02},
keywords = {urban economics, congestion pricing, parking},
url = {http://weblog.kuleuven.be/dlcount.php?id=ete\&url=http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ete/downloads/ete-wp02-02.pdf},
abstract = {
Consider the choices available to a shopper driving to a city and
trying to park downtown. One option, typical to many cities, is
to follow the signposts to an off-street parking facility,
which is often privately operated. Another option is to search for
an on-street spot. If this proves unsuccessful, it is always
possible to return to the off-street facility. We formalise
such a setting and examine optimal on-street parking policy in
the presence of an off-street market. Not surprisingly, the
amount of socially-wasteful searching behaviour is shown to
depend on the prices of both the off- and on-street market. If
the off-street market is run competitively, optimal on-street
policy reduces to a simple and attractive rule: set the
on-street price equal to the resource cost of off-street
parking supply. Other pricing rules result in either excessive
searching behaviour or excessive off-street investment costs.
Time restrictions - a common alternative to on-street fees -
are also shown to be inefficient. In practice, however,
off-street markets are unlikely to be competitive. We examine the
case of a single off-street supplier playing as a Stackelberg
follower to the government regulated on-street market. Based on
a numerical example (calibrated to London), optimal on-street
policy is shown to either involve setting a relatively high
on-street price, such that the monopolist is induced to
undercut and gain the entire parking demand, or setting a
relatively low price, while the monopolist maximises profit on
the residual demand curve. Which strategy is optimal is shown
to be parameter dependent.
}
}
@techreport{CalPro04,
author = {Edward Calthrop and Stef Proost},
title = {Regulating on-street parking},
year = 2004,
institution = {Katholieke Universiteit Leuven},
type = {Working Paper},
number = {2004-10},
keywords = {urban economics, congestion pricing, parking},
url = {http://weblog.kuleuven.be/dlcount.php?id=ete\&url=http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ete/downloads/ETE-WP-2004-10.PDF},
abstract = {
Consider a shopper or tourist driving downtown and trying to park.
Two strategies are usually available: either park at a private
off-street facility or search for a cheaper on-street spot. We
formalise such a setting and use the model to study optimal
government regulation of the on-street parking market. It is
shown that the optimal on-street fee equals the marginal cost
of off-street supply at the optimal quantity. If the off-street
market is supplied under constant returns to scale, this
provides a particular simple operational rule: the price on
street should match that off street. We also extend the model
to consider maximum length of stay restrictions and
non-competitive private supply. A numerical model, calibrated
to central London, investigates the magnitude of an optimal
fee.
}
}
@article{CalProvan00,
author = {Edward Calthrop and Stef Proost and Kurt {van Dender}},
title = {Parking Policies and Road Pricing},
year = 2000,
journal = {Urban Policy},
volume = 37,
number = 1,
pages = {63--76},
keywords = {parking, congestion pricing}
}
@article{FieKle93,
author = {G.J.~Fielding and D.B.~Klein},
title = {How to Franchise Highways},
year = 1993,
journal = {Journal of Transport Economics and Policy},
volume = 27,
number = 2,
pages = {113--130},
keywords = {transport planning, congestion pricing}
}
@article{FitSmi93,
author = {F.~Fitzroy and I.~Smith},
title = {Priority Over Pricing: Lessons from {Z}urich on the Redundacy of
Road Pricing},
year = 1993,
journal = {Journal of Transport Economics and Policy},
volume = 27,
number = 2,
pages = {207--214},
keywords = {transport planning, congestion pricing}
}
@article{Goo89,
author = {Phil Goodwin},
title = {The `Rule of Three': A Possible Solution to the Political
Problem of Competing Objectives for Road Pricing.},
year = 1989,
month = oct,
journal = {Traffic Engineering and Control},
volume = 30,
number = 10,
keywords = {congestion pricing}
}
@article{Hau90,
author = {T.D.~Hau},
title = {Electronic Road Pricing: Developments in {H}ong {K}ong},
year = 1990,
journal = {Journal of Transport Economics and Policy},
volume = 24,
number = 2,
pages = {203--214},
keywords = {congestion pricing, transport planning}
}
@techreport{Kul74,
author = {D.~Kulash},
title = {Parking taxes as roadway prices: A case study of the {S}an
{F}rancisco experience},
year = 1974,
institution = {The Urban Institute},
type = {Paper},
number = {1212-9},
address = {Washington, D.C., USA},
keywords = {congestion pricing, parking}
}
@article{ParBen02,
author = {Ian W.H.~Parry and Antonio Bento},
title = {Estimating the Welfare Effect of Congestion Taxes: The
Critical Importance of Other Distortions within the Transport
System},
year = 2002,
journal = {Journal of Urban Economics},
volume = 51,
number = 2,
pages = {339--365},
keywords = { congestion pricing, parking, urban economics }
}
@incollection{SmaGom98,
author = {Kenneth A.~Small and Jose A.~Gomez-Iba{\~n}ez},
title = {Road pricing for congestion management: the transition from
theory to policy},
year = 1998,
editor = {K.J.~Button and E.T.~Verhoef},
booktitle = {Road Pricing, Traffic Congestion and the Environment:
Issues of Efficiency and Social Feasibility},
pages = {213--246},
address = {Cheltenham, UK},
publisher = {Edward Elgar},
keywords = {congestion pricing},
annote = { A review of many pre-London congestion pricing experiments}
}
@article{SobMil99,
author = {Richard M.~Soberman and Eric J.~Miller},
title = {Impacts of full cost pricing on the sustainability of urban
transportation: towards {C}anada's {K}yoto commitment},
year = 1999,
month = jun,
journal = {Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering},
volume = 26,
number = 3,
pages = {345--354},
keywords = {transport planning, canada, congestion pricing, energy, climate mitigation}
}
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