Interestingly enough, this is apparently the first publication to translate
the term "traffic calming" into English (from the German
Verkehrsberuhigung) and to bring the concept to the
attention of transportation planners in other parts of the world
[7, p. 145].
Traffic restraint has contributed to economic improvements. The most
notable measure is retail turnover: the majority of shops in pedestrianised
streets world-wide have experienced greater turnover, and shops in
non-pedestrianised streets clamour to become part of a network of streets
for people. [... W]hile shopkeepers and central area users often oppose
any form of restraint, they quickly become supportive when they see how it
benefits them.
[p. 5]
How important is the private car to the economy of traditional urban
centres? The research shows that is it less important than commonly held,
provided there is good public transport linking the rest of the city (and
to a considerable extent, the hinterland) to its centre. Three
investigations were undertaken on this theme: shopping modal split; car
parking provision; and US experience. The first showed that car use for
shopping is nothing like as high as might generally be imagined and that in
many cities there has been a distinct shift toward public transport for
shopping purposes; having a large resident population within walking,
cycling or bus access to the centre was also of great importance. In the
second, car parking provision appears unrelated either to retail turnover
or to rents paid on retail establishments. In the third, US experience
shows that blind adherence to market principles and the omnipresence of the
automobile can lead to a city centre's shopping deteriorating or even
disappearing altogether.
[pp. 5-6]
Table 1:
Public Car Parking Spaces according to Gross Retailing
Floorspace and Turnover in the Central Business District, Table G-5, p. 96.
Sources: numerous planning departments and HGZ.
City |
1985 Population |
1984-85 Public car parking spaces |
1978-79 Gross Retail Floorspace (m2) |
Floor space per car parking space (m2) |
1978 turnover per square meter (000 DM) |
Bonn |
290 888 |
7 440 |
172 100 |
23.1 |
5.2 |
Bremen |
526 377 |
11 000 |
303 472 |
27.5 |
4.2 |
Cologne |
965 274 |
26 800 |
681 000 |
25.4 |
4.6 |
Dortmund |
576 796 |
9 000 |
378 300 |
42.0 |
4.8 |
Essen |
624 625 |
8 000 |
301 100 |
37.6 |
4.4 |
Freiburg |
179 000 |
4 611 |
208 000 |
45.1 |
4.6 |
Hanover |
536 186 |
11 960 |
398 000 |
33.3 |
4.8 |
Munich |
1 281 613 |
8 250 |
416 600 |
50.5 |
8.3 |
Nuremburg |
465 255 |
6 000 |
302 600 |
50.4 |
3.8 |
Stuttgart |
551 147 |
19 300 |
460 400 |
23.8 |
5.0 |
|
The cities with the highest ratio [of floorspace per parking space] (i.e.
least parking spaces) were Munich and Nuremburg, followed by Freiburg.
Those with the lowest ratio were Bonn, Stuttgart and Dortmund. The
relationship between this ratio and the turnover per m2 of shopping
floorspace is shown in Figure 2-6 [and Table G-5]. In fact, the figure
shows there is little relationship between car parking provision and
turnover. Instead of
a curve, fitted to a scatter from top left to bottom right of the graph
that would occur if conventional wisdom (i.e. the more car space, the
higher the turnover) were correct, there is a narrow range of turnover
within a wide range of car parking spaces. The solitary exception is
Munich, whose very high turnover per m2 is the best in Germany, probably
explained by its superlative public transport provision.
Allowing for the fact that other forces are operating on the pattern in
Figure 2-6 and that there are only 10 examples (the only ones for which all
the data was available), this still appears to be an important finding. It
is possible that an excess of parking spaces, above some threshold which we
have not had the resources to determine, acts against the success of a
traditional shopping centre for several reasons, for example the centre's
environment deteriorates in direct proportion to the number of cars moving
and parked within it [...] Another example is that car parks form a
physical barrier to the expansion of retail trade.
[p. 16]
Case Study: Vienna, Austria
- National population: 7.5 million (1984)
- Case study population: 1.5 million (1985)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 10 821 (1984)
- Car Ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 329
- Case Study Employment: 710 269 (1981)
- Public transport provision
- 48 bus routes totalling 305 km and carrying 95.7 million passengers
pa
- 35 tram routes totalling 259 km and carrying 239.0 million
passengers pa
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1971, 1974, 1978, 1984
- Components of traffic restraint: pedestrianisation, bike routes,
metro network enlargement, tram rights-of-way, traffic calming, park and
ride, inner parking restrictions (all to be expandeD)
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- 1974-1981 retail turnover in pedestrian streets increased slower
than in other streets (+15% compared with +29%) but
- 1981-1986 retail turnover in pedestrian streets increased faster
than other streets (+87% compared with +68%)
- whereas most of inner-city lost employment, city centre and
pedestrianised inner city streets gained
- Notes
- Vienna has the best statistical data of all the case studies,
including retail turnover data for many individual streets; unfortunately
the most important ones, in the city centre, are not identified
- Within the inner city, only the pedestrianised streets did not
experience a fall in retail turnover 1970 to 1984
- Employment most related to the city centre and inner city shopping
streets (shop workers, those in catering, and in financial services)
generally did better than the Bezirk in which the street was situated, and
in Vienna as a whole
- Public transport use, metro, tram and bus, has increased by between
34% and 53% in 7 or 8 years
- Future plans are for a city with reduced densities except along high
capacity public transport corridors. Between these development axes, green
wedges will grow from the green belt toward the city centre. Public
transport, walking and cycling will be the preferred modes.
[p. 26]
Case Study: Copenhagen, Denmark
- National population: 5.1 million (1985)
- Case study population: 478 615 (1985)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 14 945
- Car Ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 238
- Case Study Employment: 226 006 (1983)
- Case Study Unemployment Rate: 14% (1984)
- Public transport provision
- 225 bus routes totalling 3 800 km and carrying 310 million passengers
pa
- 7 suburban rail lines totalling 2 450 km and carrying 104 million
passengers pa
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1962, 1964, 1972, 1973
- Components of traffic restraint: pedestrianisation, improved public
transport, parking restrictions, traffic cells, traffic calming, park and
ride
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- Unequivocal statements made by traders indicating that city
centre retail turnover has increased as a result of restraint policies
- Notes
- Growing traffic congestion in the 1950s seen as a threat to the
prosperity of the city centre, but all transport measures were nevertheless
strongly car-orientated
- First restraint measures introduced as early as 1962
- Restraint resulted in larger numbers of pedestrians and enhanced
turnover and lower shop vacancies
- Restraint strongly endorsed by the Copenhagen City Centre
organisation
- Recurrent proposals for a metro were never realised
- Changing attitudes brought by restraint: the link between car use and
erosion of environmental quality became explicit5
- Car ownership and use have fallen since 1979, compensated for by
growing public transport and bicycle use
- Rejuvenation of life in Copenhagen's urban space
[p. 46]
Before the pedestrian of Strøget [in Copenhagen's CBD], fears had
been expressed about the effects on traffic volumes in surrounding streets.
Lemberg [5] noted that, overall only 76% of the traffic displaced
from the Strøget reappeared on surrounding streets, the remainder
was discouraged from driving in the centre at all. During the rush-hour the
"evaporation" of Strøget traffic was even more pronounced as only
38% of the traffic which previously used Strøget reappeared
elsewhere, and some parallel streets actually experienced a small reduction
in traffic. CBD through traffic declined by 25%. Patronage of bus and tram
services which had previously run along Strøget fell slightly
between 1962 and 1963 with some stabilisation by 1964. While this must be
set alongside a city-wide decline in patronage and the suggestion that many
passengers now used services and stops on the edge of the CBD, the figures
do suggest that if public transport is successfully to complement traffic
restraint, good access must be maintained.
[pp. 61-62]
Case Study: Lyons, France
- National population: 55 million (1985)
- Case study population: 413 000 (1982)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 12 231 (1985)
- Car Ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 490
- Case Study Employment: 516 000 (1985)
- Public transport provision
- 68 bus routes totalling 816 km and carrying 111 million passengers
pa
- 7 tram lines totalling 58 km and carrying 29 million passengers
pa
- 3 metro lines totalling 14.2 km and carrying 62 million
passengers pa
- 2 funiculars carrying 3.1 million passengers pa
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1973, 1975
- Components of traffic restraint: pedestrianisation, improved public
transport (including a new Metro line), parking controls, park and ride
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- 1976-1980 turnover increased in 2 of 3 centres with Metro,
elsewhere it declined
- Notes
- Lyons clearly benefits from being the main urban area within a
predominantly sub-regional government structure, reminiscent of the Greater
London Council
- As a consequence, Lyons has strengthened its position as France's
second city and widened its industrial, research, commercial and
international bases
- Much of this is attributable to heavy investment in public transport:
the TGV, SNCF local services, four métro lines, buses, trolleybuses, and
proposed dual-mode buses, covering and cohering the sub-region
- The sub-region has well over 6 km of pedestrianised streets, growing
fast
- Excluding walking, 1 in 4 trips were made by public transport in 1986
as against 1 in 5 in 1977, the year before the métro was opened
- It is policy to encourage people to live, shop and relax in the
centre, specifically to reduce transport infrastructure investment
- These policies and investments are thought to be causally linked to
improved trading in the centre: in three areas with métro, non-food
turnover increased in real terms by an average of 3.9% 1976 to 1986; in a
shopping area with the métro station inconveniently distanced turnover fell
by 27.7%, and in three areas without métro turnover fell on average by
22.2%
- In the very centre, the island of Presqu'île was experiencing a
downward slide in turnover pre-métro. During the period 1976-1986 turnover
has increased by 10.2% in real terms.
[p. 68]
Shopping Outside the Centre [of Lyons]
There is a wide choice of places to shop, and a 1980 survey incorporated 13
sites outside the centre: the survey found the consumer often chose one
that was less accessible but more attractive. People still walk to shops
near home for products like bread [1]. Supermarkets are visited
weekly, hypermarkets monthly or annually, large non-food outlets episodically
[1]. There are few very large stores in Lyons apart from Euromarché
at Part-Dieu and a Carrefour hypermarket at Vénissieux, though this is not
because COURLY discourages them.
Table 2:
Shopping Modal Splits in 1983, %. [10,3].
|
Food |
|
|
|
Non-food |
|
|
|
Small shop |
Street market |
Supermarket |
Hypermarket |
Small shop |
Other types |
Large stores |
Walk |
71.5 |
56.1 |
41.9 |
7.2 |
27.6 |
4.8 |
10.2 |
Car |
24.3 |
30.2 |
52.0 |
89.0 |
58.7 |
32.8 |
80.1 |
Public transport |
1.8 |
3.1 |
3.8 |
2.9 |
11.0 |
2.7 |
8.6 |
Other |
1.7 |
2.0 |
2.0 |
0.6 |
1.2 |
0.3 |
0.7 |
No response |
0.7 |
8.6 |
0.3 |
0.3 |
1.5 |
59.4 |
0.4 |
|
[pp. 72-73]
The policies first implemented in German residential areas originated in
the Netherlands. Individual planners in Delft had tried to improve the
street environment in areas of old housing stock, and most of these street
improvements paralleled rehabilitation of dwellings. Street improvements
took the form of substantial tree planting, narrowing the carriageway,
increasing the space for social activities and giving residents part of the
street space gained so they could create their own individual designs.
Mostly footways were eliminated, cars had to drive at walking pace and
parking was limited to specific areas. These schemes started around 1970,
became known as Woonerven (living yards) and were quickly adopted by other
Dutch local authorities. By 1976 the Woonerven obtained legal status
expressed through a traffic sign. Originally Woonerven only appeared in
residential streets with low traffic flows. The Woonerven concept was then
extended to shopping streets, which were termed 'Winkelerven'.
It was not surprising that the Land closest to the Dutch border, North
Rhine Westphalia, was the first to adopt the Woonerf concept. Another
reason was that this Land was controlled by the Social Democratic Party
which was politically interested in promoting car restraint policies. In
1977, this Land started a pilot programme of Verkehrsberuhigung (traffic
calming) and `Tempo 30' in several towns. During this time the concept of
`winkelerven' was also introduced—according to Monheim [6] there
were at least 56 winkelerven in small towns and villages in this Land.
Furthermore, there have been many new types of combination of winkelerven
and pedestrianisation.
[p. 88]
Case Study: Freiburg, Federal Republic of Germany
- National population: 61.2 million (1985)
- Case study population: 175 185 (1987)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 13 543 (1985)
- Car Ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 382
- Case Study Employment: 82 403 (1987)
- Case Study Unemployment Rate: 11.0 (1987)
- Public transport provision
- tram lines totalling 22.5 km
- bus service
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1973, 1977
- Components of traffic restraint: pedestrianisation, parking control,
improved public transport, traffic calming, bike routes
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- Rental levels increased from DM50 per m2 in 1977 to DM120 per
m2 in 1979 following pedestrianisation
- Retailers believe turnover has increased
- Doubtful HGZ data suggest less positive effects
- Notes
- Freiburg has managed the seemingly impossible: it has increased its
public transport ridership substantially for little expenditure of money
- The key to this achievement is a profound respect for the local
environment, both built and `natural': residents have realised that
destruction of the Black Forest is powerfully connected to vehicle
emissions
- The city has a policy of modest car parking, one of the largest
pedestrian zones in Europe, and traffic calming measures citywide
- Central area car parking is at a lower level than many other German
cities, but shop and office rents are high, and have increased greatly
since 1972—rents for the best quality shops increased 500% since then.
- At the same time city centre retail turnover has decreased,
apparently (and apart from declining trade trends in all German cities)
because of the late arrival of out-of-town shopping in the surrounding area
and an enlarge, low-spending, student population.
[p. 102]
Case Study: Hanover, Federal Republic of Germany
- National population: 61.2 million (1985)
- Case study population: 527 000 (1987)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 13 543 (1985)
- Car Ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 327
- Case Study Employment: 279 864 (1985)
- Case Study Unemployment Rate: 13.9 (1987)
- Public transport provision
- 69 km of light rail system and 26 km of tram, together carrying
47 million passengers pa and 64 million passenger-km
- 13 bus routes
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1956, 1974, 1986
- Components of traffic restraint: bus lanes, pedestrianisation,
traffic calming, parking control, bike routes, improved public transport,
park and ride
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- 1968-1979 CBD performed worse than the city and hinterland
- 1979-1985 CBD performance stablised
- Notes
- Despite substantial road construction, Hanover's planning policies
quickly established the need for good public transport
- Urban growth has been limited to defined growth poles which have been
connected with an extensive network of light rail and trams
- Recent concern for environmental issues has complemented good public
transport with measures designed to discourage car use, and several road
projects have been abandoned
- The number of parking spaces in the CBD is limited. There is no
attempt to match the parking:floorspace ratio found in out of centre
shopping developments
- Traffic restraint may have slowed the decline of the CBD's retail
turnover caused by competition from shopping developments elsewhere in the
region
- Traffic restraint has caused a shift away from car use and towards
public transport and bicycle use for CBD shopping trips, especially on a
Saturday
- All of this has happened despite Hanover's comparatively poor
economic position among the four German cities studied. Its rents are the
lowest and its unemployment rate the highest. Nevertheless, its turnover
showed a more positive change 1978-84 of all the four cities.
[p. 120]
Case Study: Stuttgart, Federal Republic of Germany
- National population: 61.2 million (1985)
- Case study population: 551 147 (1987)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 13 543 (1985)
- Car Ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 399
- Case Study Employment: 412 900 (1983)
- Case Study Unemployment Rate: 5.1% (1985)
- Public transport provision
- 35.7 km of light rail system and 77.4 km of tram, together carrying
130 million passengers pa and 735 million passenger-km
- 66 bus routes
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1960 to date
- Components of traffic restraint: pedestrianisation, traffic calming,
parking control, bike routes, improved public transport, park and ride
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- Retailers argue that traffic restraint has increased turnover by
10-15% during the last 10 years
- Notes
- Stuttgart was a late starter with pedestrianisation and innovative
public transport
- Its CBD is the most important part of a polycentric sub-region;
several of the smaller centres are rich, and Stuttgart is competing well
with them
- Its CBD is overendowed with parking spaces. Attempts to curb car use
have not been wholly successful in a sub-region dominated by car
manufacture; nevertheless, Stuttgart has been in the forefront in
introducing traffic calming
- While its CBD overall lost 12% of its retail turnover, in real
terms, between 1978 and 1984, retailes in the Königstraße claim
their 10-15% turnover increase over 10 years may be attributed to traffic
restraint
- Though S-Bahn and light rail networks have enlarged greatly, there
has not been the overall increase in public transport use of some other
cities
- However, department store users made a substantial shift toward
public transport (up to 19%) 1976-84
[p. 138]
Case Study: London, Great Britain
- National population: 54.91 million (1984)
- Case study population: 6 713 165 (1981, Greater London)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 10 509 (1985)
- Car Ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 323
- Case Study Employment: 3 466 000 (1985)
- Case Study Unemployment Rate: 11.6% (1985)
- Public transport provision
- 9 underground lines totalling 398 km and carrying 536 million
passengers pa
- bus routes totalling 19 680 km and carrying 1 418 million
passengers pa
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 'Fares Fair', October 1981 to March 1982
- Components of traffic restraint: isolated examples of
pedestrianisation, non-statutory traffic calming
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- Where pedestrianisation has occurred, retail turnover has, almost
without exception, increased substantially.
- It is estimated that TEST's restraint proposals would have large
economic benefits
- Notes
- The main form of restraint operating in London today is traffic
congestion
- Compared with other case studies, London has a very low level of
provision for pedestrians
- The final GLC administration demonstrated the rôle that low fares
have to play in reducing car commuting and increasing public transport use
- Limited experience with measures such as pedestrianisation has
demonstrated the clear economic benefits that accrue from restraining car
use.
- TEST presents a series of proposals which would bring the capital's
quality of environment up to the level found in other case study cities and
which would benefit the economy.
[p. 162]
Case Study: Bologna, Italy
- National population: 57.15 million (1984)
- Case study population: 436 077 (1986)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 9 676 (1984)
- Car Ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 390
- Case Study Employment: 160 085 (1981)
- Public transport provision
- 28 bus routes totalling 283 km and carrying 159 million
passengers pa
- improvements in suburban rail services, reintroduction of
trolly-buses and the development of a metro
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1972 onwards
- Components of traffic restraint: pedestrianisation, traffic cells,
parking restrictions, access restrictions, bicycle routes, public transport
improvement, park and ride, and ring roads
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- Although aim was not to increase retail turnover, many shops have
benfitted from restraint.
- More trips to central area suggest more CBD jobs.
- Notes
- High traffic levels before straint were `suffocating' already
disadvantaged inner-city
- Restraint measures introduced as one aspect of policies to conserve
the city centre for all to enjoy; aim to prevent gentrification and
commercialisation
- Restraint backed up with comprehensive information campaign,
emphasised that `congestion does not pay'
- Decentralisation of congesting activities
- Restraint throughout Bologna to discourage car use at journey origin
and destination
- Complex restraint package created city centre traffic-cells
- Switch from private to public transport encouraged by better services
and free travel during peak hours
- New trolley-bus services to be introduced, plans for a metro
- Despite policies to prevent city centre commercial growth, restraint
has benfitted local retailing turnover
[p. 186]
Another facet of the commune's traffic restraint was the
refusal to increase the volume of parking provision within Bologna. The
commune argued that additional provision would increase demand both for
further parking space and for road space. Since the commune was developing
a policy to encourage the use of public transport wherever possible, the
issue of new parking provision, even on the periphery of the historic
centre, was largely irrelevant. So, the commune prohibited further car park
construction within Bologna. This control extended to developers and
companies who, in other cities, are often anxious to include parking
provision in any new building. The construction of new car parks was also
politically unacceptable because of the negative effects on the immediate
vicinity. The only area where the commune was prepared to construct new car
parks was on main roads at the extreme edge of the city.
[p. 197]
Stienstra [9] suggested that the winkelerf enabled walking quality
to be improved on a shopping street without banning all traffic. The
pedestrian has priority, while cars and bicycles enter as `guests'. The
approach was therefore quite different from Groningen's
sector+pedestrianisation one; theoretically the winkelerf solves the
conflict between environmental improvement of a street on the one hand and
worsened access to it on the other. However, to succeed, severe speed
reductions have to be observed and in Germany as well as the Netherlands
many drivers, particularly of mopeds, are insufficiently civilised to do
this. And, according to Stienstra, because the winkelerf (unlike the
woonerf) had not been canonised with legislation in 1982, enforcement was
impossible. So, physical restraint had to be applied: humps in the road,
chicanes, brick enclosed flower beds, etc. Dalby & Williamson
[2] discussed some of the problems that arose in Delft.
[...]
The Dutch were also pioneers of full pedestrianisation. Gantvoort
[4] notes the `Verstedelijkingsnota' or urbanization report of
1977 in which `the government clearly declared that for its part domination
of the motor car had ended.' The new objectived became to `restore,
preserve and improve quality of life in urban areas, especially in the
older residential quarters; design residential areas so...infrastructure
does not cause too much annoyance; encourage use of bicycle and
moped...improve public transport...stimulate selective use of the motor
car.' Pedestrian shopping streets, rather as in Britain, were invariably
incorporated in post-war rebuilding, a famous example being in Rotterdam.
[p. 204]
Case Study: Groningen, The Netherlands
- National population: 14.4 million (1984)
- Case study population: 168 000 (1986)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 11 409 (1985)
- Case Study Employment: 81 874 (1986)
- Public transport provision
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1970, 1977
- Components of traffic restraint: pedestrianisation, traffic cells,
parking control, bike routes
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- 1976-1978 59% of traders reported no change in turnover, 2% an
increase and 25% a decrease
- Notes
- Groningen followed Bremen with the traffic cell concept. While at
first this adversely affected trade, stability was achieved within a few
years
- Business delivery vehicles have invaded the cells' purity in number
of locations
- Vehicle numbers, noise, air pollution and accidents have all fallen
in the city centre but have increased in surrounding areas. The ring road
outside the CBD has proven inadequate to cope with the displaced traffic
- Ten years after the introduction of the cell system it is well
accepted by traders, employees and visitors alike; it has gained a place on
the planning pilgrims' European itinerary
[p. 206]
Case Study: Gothenburg, Sweden
- National population: 8.4 million (1984)
- Case study population: 425 331 (1985)
- National GDP per capita: ECU 12 150 (1982)
- Car ownership (per 1000 inhabitants): 335
- Case Study Employment: 194 030 (1980)
- Public transport provision
- 64 bus routes totalling 816 km and carrying 46 million passengers
pa
- 9 tram routes totalling 132 km and carrying 51 million passengers
pa
- 9 LRT routes totalling 77 km and carrying 97 million passengers
pa
- Date(s) of traffic restraint: 1970, 1974
- Components of traffic restraint: pedestrianisation, traffic cells,
parking restrictions, public transport improvement, bus lanes, bike routes,
ring roads
- Probable links between traffic restraint policies and economic
changes:
- Soon after restraint retail turnover increased slightly, after
four years more positive increases
- 1972-1977 The CBD's trade stabilised; its share of regional
turnover in 1972 was 18% and it fell only slightly to 16% in 1977
- Notes
- Objectives are to improve the environment, enhance trading
performance and increase safety of road users (common to all case study
cities)
- Policy is to minimise car use and encourage public transport use,
working outward from the CBD to the Central Urban Area and Gothenburg as a
whole
- The cell system was introduced in 1970 and extended in 1976; it has
been so successful that further extensions are planned
- People are encouraged to live in the centre of Gothenburg, where the
majority of new housing is being built
- CBD trading patterns have stabilised and the CBD's proportion of
Greater Gothenbuirg's turnover has been constant over 15 years
- Public transport use in the CBD has increased considerably, and to a
lesser extent for journeys to and from the CBD
- Accidents, noise and air pollution have all reduced in the CBD and,
to a lesser extent, the Central Urban Area
[p. 224]
- 1
-
Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon, Direction Promotion du Commerce,
Service Urbanisme Commercial et Etudes.
Deplacements moyens de transports liés aux achats.
Technical report, Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon, Lyon,
France, 1983.
- 2
-
E. Dalby and A.E. Williamson.
Pedestrian and traffic management. techniques in Delft: report of a
visit made in December 1975.
Technical Report SR257, Crowthorne Transport & Road Research
Laboratory, 1977.
- 3
-
Jean Frebault and Christiane Dalmais.
Transports en commun et politique urbaine dans l'agglomération
Lyonnaise.
Technical report, Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communauté Urbaine de
Lyon, Lyon, France, 1988.
- 4
-
J.Th. Gantvoort.
Pedestrian planning in the Netherlands.
In World Developments in Pedestrian Planning, Glasgow, UK, July
1982.
- 5
-
Kai Lemberg.
Pedestrian streets and other motor vehicle traffic restraints in
central Copenhagen.
Technical report, City of Copenhagen, General Planning Department,
1973.
- 6
-
Rolf Monheim.
Der Städtische Raum in Frankreich und in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Studien zur internationalen Schulbuchforschung
Schriftenreihe des Georg-Eckert Instituts, 50:287-305, 1987.
- 7
-
Peter W.G. Newman and Jeffrey R. Kenworthy.
Sustainability and Cities: Overcoming
Automobile Dependence.
Island Press, Washington, D.C., USA, 1999.
- 8
-
John Roberts.
Quality streets: How traditional urban centres benefit from
traffic-calming.
Technical Report 75, Transport and Environmental Studies (TEST),
London, UK, May 1988.
- 9
-
Sj. Stienstra.
The Winkelerf: improving environment for pedestrians in shopping
streets without banning all cars.
In PTRC Summer Annual Meeting. Warwick University, 1982.
- 10
-
Syndicat des Transports en Commun de la Région Lyonnaise (SYTRAL).
L'agglomération Lyonnaise et les transports de personnes.
Technical report, SYTRAL, Lyon, France, 1984.